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Fiscal policies in the recent juncture: responding to the cyclical slowdown …
2001 proved to be the most challenging period for fiscal policy in the three-year history of EMU
as the global slowdown provided the first real stress test of EMU’s multilateral surveillance
framework, and especially its budgetary dimension. The budget deficit for the euro area reached
1.3% of GDP, up from 0.7% in 2000. Despite this first reversal in the process of budgetary
consolidation since 1993 and criticism about perceived failure to strictly adhere to the provisions
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), there are several grounds for considering the framework
for budgetary aspects of the multilateral surveillance framework have performed well in
responding to the cyclical slowdown.
Firstly, Member States had scope to let the automatic stabilisers operate so as to cushion the
negative shock. This was especially the case in countries which had already achieved a budget
balance or surplus. Automatic stabilisers were also allowed to work in countries that had not yet
completed the transition to the close-to-balance target of the SGP. However, deficits in Germany
and Portugal started to rise and approach the 3% of GDP reference value.
Secondly, countries  did not embark on unwarranted expansionary policies. Fiscal authorities
came under considerable pressure to relax consolidation commitments and resort to active
demand management in response to the global slowdown. The structural budget deficit in 2001
of 1.5% of GDP is almost unchanged compared with 2000: this illustrates that the deterioration
in the actual budget balances was mostly due to operation of the automatic stabilisers. Indeed, it
is worth noting that despite the slowdown, actual budget balances were unchanged in Belgium,
Denmark and Italy and indeed improved in Greece, Spain, Austria and Sweden.
Thirdly, Member States have been able to continue with planned tax reforms designed to remove
supply side rigidities, despite claims from different quarters  that the SGP was unnecessarily tying
the hands of the authorities through arbitrary and inflexible rules. What EMU’s budgetary rules
emphasise is the need to accompany these tax reforms with appropriate measures on the
spending side given the fact that tax reductions are seldom self-financing. Such measures are
paramount to guarantee the sustainability of tax reforms and thus should reinforce their impact
on investment and consumption.
The confirmation of the commitment to the rules and spirit of the SGP helped achieve a
balanced policy mix which was supportive to growth while guaranteeing price stability. Whilst
fiscal policies remained broadly neutral, monetary conditions eased markedly. Such a policy mix is
appropriate not only from a cyclical standpoint, but also in a medium and longer term
perspective, considering the need to boost private investment and potential growth and to
prepare for the budgetary pressures of ageing populations. Recent short-term indicators point to
a turnaround in the European economy, and thus expansionary measures may ex post have turned
out to be pro-cyclical. This assessment of the performance of the framework for budgetary
surveillance needs to be tempered with caution as the recent downturn was neither particularly
severe or prolonged. Budgetary positions of “close to balance or in surplus” are still not met in all
countries. Rapidly achieving such targets is the best way to ensure that Member States have
sufficient room for manoeuvre should a recession arise in the future.
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In early 2002, attention has mostly focussed on the cyclical response to the slowdown and on the
procedures for dealing with slippage from budgetary targets,  especially the debate on whether an
early-warning recommendation should be issued to Germany and Portugal. However, it is
important not to overlook a number of significant measures that have strengthened the quality
and coverage of budgetary surveillance, and improved the analytical tools available to the
Commission and Council for policy assessment. While seemingly technical, these are important
advances which will help improve the coherence and effectiveness of EMU’s fiscal framework.
Firstly in July 2001, the ECOFIN Council revised the Code of Conduct on the content and
presentation of stability and convergence programmes (which dated from 1998) taking into
account the experiences of three years in EMU. Member States applied the Code to the recently
updated programmes. The revised Code provides for a clustered submission of programmes with
budgetary targets based on external macroeconomic assumptions that have been agreed in
common. It also clarifies the interpretation as to what constitutes an appropriate medium-term
target of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ for each Member State. Finally, it extends the coverage of
programmes to include sections on the quality and sustainability of public finances in line with
the Lisbon conclusions. The most important result of the application of the new Code is
probably the improved ability to consider the implications for the euro area as a whole of the
budgetary policies outlined in the national programmes. This was particularly valuable given the
high degree of uncertainty surrounding the economic situation at the end of 2001 and beginning
of 2002. In time, this will also allow the euro area dimension to be increasingly factored into
national budgetary policies.
Second, the economic downturn underlined the importance of paying close attention to the
cyclically-adjusted budget balances when examining the budgetary positions of Member States.
While measuring the impact of the economic cycle on budget positions is complex and subject to
uncertainties, it is important that all actors involved in the surveillance process have a common
view on the underlying budgetary developments. Inter alia, the cyclical adjustment of budget
balances is used when evaluating the minimum cyclical safety margins under the 3% of GDP
reference value and the respect of the “close to balance or in surplus” target of the Stability and
Growth Pact. In order to ensure consistency, broad agreement has been reached between the
Commission and Council on a method to measure cyclically adjusted budget balances based on a
production function approach to estimating the output gap.
Third, a major extension of EU budgetary surveillance was achieved with the first systematic
assessment of the sustainability of public finances in light of ageing populations. This was made
on the basis of the updated stability and convergence programmes submitted in late 2001. The
analysis shows the potential risk for emerging budgetary imbalances in many Member States, and
emphasises the importance of achieving and sustaining the medium-term targets set down in
their programmes.
The importance of the early-warning system
A critical juncture in the budgetary surveillance process was reached in January 2002, only weeks
after the introduction of euro notes and coins, when the European Commission recommended
that an early-warning be sent to Germany and Portugal under the SGP. Both countries missed
the targets for 2001 set down in their stability programmes by a wide margin (over 1% of GDP),
and there was a clear risk of deficits approaching the 3% of GDP reference value for the budget
deficit. In the face of such clear-cut slippage from agreed targets, the Commission acted to
preserve credibility of  the legal and political obligations of the Pact. As a result of discussions in
the ECOFIN Council on the Commission’s draft recommendation for an early-warning,
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Commission’s concerns: the Council therefore decided to close the procedure. Both countries
reiterated their willingness to avoid a breach of the 3% of GDP reference value, to resume the
process of budgetary consolidation and to reach their medium-term targets by 2004. At the same
time the Council restated the importance of the early-warning system in the overall framework
for budgetary surveillance and confirmed that the Commission had acted in accordance with  the
provisions of the Pact.
The credibility of the rules-based framework for the co-ordination of budget policies will have to
receive particular attention in the future. A relevant distinction here is between the process of the
early-warning and its outcome.  It is important to avoid a perception in public opinion that the
rules can be changed or at least avoided in challenging circumstances. Commitment to the
framework for budgetary surveillance was confirmed by the Council and so was the importance
of the SGP. The early-warning procedure can and will be used again if the need arises. Obviously,
to maintain the credibility of the SGP, it is important that the commitments of Germany and
Portugal are implemented in full. Positive evidence is emerging that  these commitments are
being taken seriously. In particular, following the agreement in the ECOFIN Council of February
2002, a domestic stability pact between the Länder and the Bund in Germany has been agreed.
Looking to the future: attaining the goal of the Stability and Growth Pact …
Maintaining credibility in the SGP also requires the Commission and Council to demonstrate a
capacity to learn from this first experience with the early-warning mechanism. While the SGP has
undergone the first real stress test and the economic situation is forecast to improve, there is no
room for complacency. Important budgetary challenges remain to be tackled.
First of all, once economic recovery has gathered pace, the budgetary consolidation process to
meet the ‘close-to-balance’ rule of the Pact must start again and any lost ground should be
quickly recovered. In the latest updates of stability and convergence programmes, Member States
which still have a budget deficit confirm their commitment to reach the medium-term target of
the SGP by 2003 or 2004. Moreover, the budgetary adjustment planned for coming years will be
achieved via reductions in both revenue and expenditure, in line with the recommendations of
the BEPGs. Meeting the budgetary commitments to reach the medium-term targets foreseen in
the stability and convergence programmes is paramount to underpin the credibility of the Pact.
This is especially the case for the four countries still in deficit (Germany, France, Italy and
Portugal).
Second, as past experience shows, budgetary mistakes tend to occur mainly in good times. The
debate back in 2000 on how to distribute the so-called “growth dividends” between tax cuts and
spending increases defy, as the Commission pointed out at the time, not only the rules of the
SGP, but also economic logic. It is important not to consider improvements in the budget
balance due to a favourable economic juncture as permanent, thus providing scope for tax
reductions or expenditure increases. The budgetary constraint affecting mainly the large euro area
countries in 2001 and 2002 have their roots in the missed opportunities of the high-growth
period 1998-2000. Preventing a deterioration in structural budget balances during upturns is
probably the most daunting challenge for the SGP. Surveillance will need to ensure that countries
still not complying with the requirements of the Pact take the opportunity of the recovery to
accelerate fiscal retrenchment while the others let automatic stabilisers operate fully. In brief,
financing tax reductions and spending rises via the automatic fruit of economic growth or
accelerating the tax cuts as soon as growth revives is misguided both from the point of view of
fiscal prudence and cyclical stabilisation.
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countries abide by the SGP’s fiscal philosophy, they will choose a broadly balanced budget in
structural terms and let automatic stabilisers play freely over the cycle. This is based on the well-
known pitfalls of active fiscal management (implementation and recognition lags, model
uncertainty, measure irreversibility, etc.). The circumstances under which counter-cyclical
discretionary fiscal actions (going beyond the operation of the automatic stabilisers) may be both
desirable and effective are very narrow: they could be envisaged in the event of large country-
specific demand shocks originating domestically and entailing strong inflationary or deflationary
pressures. Even in these cases, however, the risk that an ex ante counter-cyclical policy becomes
ex post pro-cyclical is high. Moreover, the room for manoeuvre for the discretionary stimulus
would have to be created in order not to breach the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling. For a number of
countries, this would imply going beyond the close-to-balance rule of the Pact. A clear agreement
between the EMU policy actors on the criteria to assess discretionary fiscal policies would
increase the transparency and predictability of budgetary behaviour. While the role for
discretionary should be confined to critical country specific shocks, this does not mean that
policy co-ordination should be confined to exceptional circumstances. By its very nature,
occasional co-ordination is ill-suited for implementing a consistent macroeconomic strategy in
both normal and exceptional situations. Policy co-ordination – viewed as a system to attain a
common assessment of the economic situation, agree on the orientation of the policy response
and monitor their implementation – should be regular, not occasional.
Finally, several Member States are trying to improve the compatibility between their national
fiscal rules and EU budgetary commitments. The Treaty and the Pact leave it up to Member
States to determine their own budgetary procedures to achieve SGP targets. However, the
financial relevance of regional governments and other sub-sectors of the government in the
budget process in federal states and strongly regionalised states (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy
and Austria) has highlighted the necessity for Member States to find solutions to secure sustained
discipline at all levels of government. To address this coordination problem, several Member
States have already adopted special arrangements among government levels, in what could be
termed ‘internal stability pacts’. A common characteristic of these pacts is the effort to clarify and
share the responsibility for budget discipline among the different  levels of government.
… while addressing the long run sustainability of public finances
Fiscal discipline is not only about running sound public finances in the short to medium-term. It
also requires that public finances are sustainable in the long run, i.e. that current budget policies
do not lead to or risk causing future budgetary imbalances in breach of SGP requirements due to
the budgetary effects of ageing populations. Sustainability also requires that age-related
expenditures (pensions, health care) do not crowd-out other essential public spending such as
investment and R&D. Moreover, future generations should benefit from an adequate public
capital stock and should not face an unfair tax burden.
The information included in the stability and convergence programmes shows that ageing
populations will have a considerable budgetary impact. Public spending is projected to increase
by between 4% and 8% of GDP in the coming four decades in most Member States, although
much higher increases are projected in several countries. Increases in public spending due to
ageing populations will start as of 2010 as the baby-boom generation enter into retirement, and
the steepest increases will occur usually between 2020 and 2035.
The analysis shows that on the basis of current policies, there is a risk of budgetary imbalances
emerging in many Member States, and these risks multiply if countries fail to reach the medium-
term targets set down in their stability and convergence programmes. All countries will face a
budgetary challenge posed by ageing populations, even those which appear to be well placed to
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sustainability is dependent upon running large budget surpluses over several decades, illustrating
the continued need to give preference to debt reduction over the long run. Other Member States
face a challenge of meeting the additional costs of ageing populations while at the same time
pursuing other budgetary objectives, notably keeping the tax burden at reasonable levels.
Faced with this challenge, several countries have put in place comprehensive strategies, including
measures to raise employment rates especially amongst women and older workers, reform of age-
sensitive transfers programmes, and commitments to run sustained budget surpluses so as to
achieve a rapid reduction in public debt levels prior to the impact of ageing populations taking
hold. However,  the ambitious and comprehensive reforms of some Member States contrast with
rather piecemeal approaches in other countries which fail to recognise the seriousness of the
policy challenge. Several countries have established pension reserve funds in recent years to meet
future expenditure increases. While this is a welcome development, the extent to which they will
meet future costs is questionable (with the exception of Ireland) given the limited resources
which have already been invested in them and uncertainty as regards the size and frequency of
contributions. Overall, policy makers need to be more aware that it is short- to medium-term
budgetary choices which determine the capacity of countries to meet the budgetary costs of
ageing populations.
New frontiers of budgetary surveillance and coordination: factoring in the “quality” of
public spending …
Public spending has risen sharply in the EU over the past three decades to 47% of GDP in 2001,
having declined during the Maastricht process of budgetary consolidation from over 51% of
GDP in 1995.  The average size of the government sector in the EU remains well above levels in
other industrialised countries and is 15 percentage points of GDP above that in the US. The
aggregate picture, however, hides considerable disparity in the size of the government spending
across Member States.
Public spending on the basic function of the State and other measures to improve the allocation
of resources (defence, justice, education, health care, R&D, economic services) has remained
remarkably stable over the past 30 years, and is very similar (between 14% and 16% of GDP)
across EU countries. The difference in overall government spending levels in the EU compared
with the US mainly reflects spending on social protection programmes, this being a typical
feature of the European Social Model. The largest increases in spending on social protection have
been recorded in countries that had relatively immature social protection systems at the beginning
of the 1980s. Conversely, countries with high levels of spending in the early 1980s have started in
the last decade to reduce the amount of resources devoted to social welfare.
The stricter budget constraint facing Member States in EMU, coupled with efforts to raise the
employment and growth performance as part of the Lisbon agenda, requires that greater
attention be paid to how public resources are spent and how taxes are levied. However, cross-
country analyses have been hampered by the lack of timely and comparable data on the
functional classification of public expenditures. As a consequence, while considerable progress
has already been accomplished on long term sustainability of public finances, whereas
surveillance of the quality of public finances, as required by the European Council, is still at an
early stage.
The difficulty in putting in place an effective monitoring of the quality of public spending is also
due to the conceptual difficulty in defining what ‘quality’ actually means. A certain composition
of public expenditure could be considered as ‘high quality’ if it makes a positive contribution to
the goals of the Lisbon strategy, i.e. making the Union the most dynamic, competitive, knowledge
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environmental sustainability. On this basis, Member States can promote growth and employment
by redirecting public expenditure towards physical and human capital accumulation and research
and development. Investment in human capital and infrastructure can have a robust effect on
long-term growth and new innovative approaches to financing should be sought, including public
private partnerships. Appropriate spending on social welfare, together with an appropriate tax
policy, can contribute to equity and can also have a positive impact on growth and economic
efficiency.
Countries appear to have been able to improve the composition of public expenditure while at
the time containing the size of the public sector during the 1990s. In this context, it is worth
mentioning that the EU budget complemented Member States’ expenditure in growth promoting
categories such as investment and R&D. Before drawing firm policy conclusions about the level
and composition of public spending, it is essential to conduct microeconomic analysis that takes
into account the specific aims of spending programmes, their design and  linkages with other
policy instruments. A precondition for doing so is the availability of suitable data, the elaboration
of which has already been identified as a priority area by successive European Councils.
… and preparing for enlargement
Accession negotiations are currently underway with twelve of the thirteen candidate countries
who wish to join the EU. The Treaty provisions and secondary legislation (the acquis
communautaire) on economic and budgetary policy will apply to these countries once they join the
EU. A major policy challenge is to implement upon accession the EU framework for budgetary
surveillance taking into account the specific needs and circumstances of the candidate countries.
Key budgetary issues are faced by a sub-set of candidate countries, namely the ten countries from
central and eastern Europe (CEECs) as they approach entry into the EU and, differently from
the other candidate countries, undergo a transition from a command to a market economy.
The overall relative level and composition of revenues and expenditures in CEECs resemble
those in present EU Member States, although significant differences for individual countries and
budgetary components exist at times.  This is a remarkable fact since CEECs have had only ten
years to implement ex novo a fiscal system. While the size of CEECs governments is on average
higher than in most emerging economies, this can be largely explained by  underlying economic
factors. There remains, however, a need to reassess the structure of budget revenues and
expenditures to foster a growth-enhancing environment providing sufficient space and incentives
for private sector development.
A key requirement for budgetary surveillance are reliable and timely government accounts. This
has proved to be difficult for countries undergoing a transition to a market economy. From an
institutional point of view, treasury departments had to be created and far-reaching modifications
were required to accounting and recording procedures. Developing the capability to provide
timely and reliable data with an appropriate coverage has been a lengthy task, which is not yet
completed and there is scope for further improving the quality of budgetary data. From a
conceptual point of view, the transition to a market economy is shifting the boundaries between
the state and the private sector, making it somewhat  difficult to interpret and compare
government accounts in the CEECs. Many of the underlying problems, however, are decreasing
as transition advances and the acquis communautaire is progressively implemented.
Budgetary surveillance will also need to take into account that the CEECs are undergoing
tremendous structural and institutional changes. These changes are not only driven by the
completion of a move from a command to a market economy, but also by the liberalisation
effects which EU membership will entail, the need to upgrade public infrastructure and the
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requirements. All of these changes have significant budgetary implications that need to be
factored into the evaluation of the budgetary situation. In addition, due consideration must be
given to the constraints imposed by the fact that, on average, CEECs are characterised by a
higher degree of volatility in output levels compared with EU Member States and are small open
economies which rely heavily on foreign capital to finance catching up.
Since 2001, the Commission has implemented a new initiative called the Pre-accession Fiscal
Surveillance Procedure (PFSP) which is designed to closely approximate the policy co-ordination
and surveillance mechanisms of the EU while giving due regard to the accession priorities of the
candidate countries. The assessment of budgetary positions in the run up to accession should
therefore be flexible enough to cater for the uncertain and fast changing circumstances facing
economies undergoing rapid change, but at the same time rigorous enough to cater for the very
real challenge facing the CEECs.
Accordingly, in the run up to accession, candidate countries are required to comply with the
Copenhagen criteria rather than fulfilling the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria. The
primary concern in the pre-accession period is medium-term macroeconomic stability, rather
than achieving any particular target for the budget balance. Medium-term budgetary policy should
also pursue a structure of expenditure and revenues that effectively supports economic growth.
At the same time, the emphasis on structural and institutional reform should not hide the
importance of sound fiscal policies. CEECs’ vulnerability to economic shocks and the external
constraints they face underline the need for prudent policies. The appropriate deficit level may
vary across countries and is likely to be a function of elements such as the speed of structural
reforms, the relative speed of economic growth, the extent of real convergence and the level of
debt.
